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ARGUMENT
The State appears to be confused as to who the defendant is in this case. This case
involves whether Defendant Jamis Johnson made fraudulent statements in connection with
the offer or sale of a security. Yet, the State's brief demonstrates little evidence exists
regarding statements of any kind made by Johnson during the transaction at issue. Instead,
the State's brief focuses on Paul A. Schwenke. The State, for example, acknowledges that
Schwenke was the one who did most of the talking, who came up with the idea for
American Dairy.com Corp. ("American Dairy"), and who described the plan to both
Johnson and the alleged victims, Ronald Myers ("Myers") and James Young ('Toung"). (See
Appellee's Br., pp. 5-6.) Schwenke introduced Johnson to Myers and Young, and
purportedly described Johnson as a "stock expert" and a "high powered lawyer." (See id.)
In contrast to Schwenke, by all accounts Johnson's involvement was very limited.
The State has never identified a single "untrue statement of material fact" made by Johnson
during the events at issue. In fact, both Young and Myers testified that Johnson made no
statements that turned out not to be true. (R. 1999:153,191, 232.)
Undaunted by the lack of evidence of actual statements by Johnson meeting the
statutory requirements, the State zealously prosecuted Johnson for what he allegedly failed to
say. The State argues that Johnson violated Section 61-1-1(2) of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act (the "Act") by making an omission of material fact in connection with the
offer or sale of a security. However, the State's "omission" case against Johnson is based
upon a fundamental misinterpretation of Utah's Act Sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 make it
unlawful for "any person" in connection with the "offer" or "sale" of a security to
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"willfully" omit to state a material fact necessary to make a statement actually made by that
person not misleading, in light of the circumstances in which the statement is made. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2), 61-1-21 (2000). The State has not identified any statements by
Johnson that were rendered misleading by an omission.
Nevertheless, the State mistakenly asserts that because Johnson is a so-called "control
person" of American Dairy, he has enhanced disclosure obligations and, as a result, greater
criminal liability than other persons under Section 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21. Stated otherwise,
the State insists that a "president" of a corporation can be convicted of violating Sections
61-1-1 and 61-1-21 even though the president says nothing at all because such control
persons have a "broad" yet vaguely defined "list" of information, such as "historical business
information," they must always affirmatively disclose. {See Appellee's Br. pp. 7-8.)
This "pure omission" interpretation is simply not supported by the language of the
Act and, as such, undermines the State's entire case against Johnson. There is no "control
person" criminal liability under the Act through enhanced affirmative disclosure obligations
or otherwise. Notably, Johnson was not charged with conspiracy (with Schwenke or
American Dairy) to violate Section 61-1-1 nor with some form of secondary or vicarious
liability as a control person of American Dairy. Johnson was charged as an individual'with
violating Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21. (R. 63-65.) Moreover, the Act is not even applicable
to Johnson in this case because he did not offer or sell securities to Myers and Young for
value. Nevertheless, the trial court permitted the State to present its incorrect interpretation
to the jury, both through the prosecutor's statements and the testimony of its expert witness,
the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities, Michael Hines.
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I.

T H E SECURITIES ACT DOES N O T PROVIDE FOR AFFIRMATIVE
DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS OR OTHER SUCH E N H A N C E D
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CONTROL PERSONS,
A.

Section 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 makes each "person" criminally liable only for
his own material misstatements or omissions and does not require
affirmative disclosures of any "person,"

Section 61-1-1(2) makes it "unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer,
sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly . .. to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) (emphasis added). Utah
Code Section 61-1-21(2) provides criminal liability and penalties for any "person" who
"willfully" violates Section 61-1-1. Id § 61-1-21 (2)(a).
Utah Code Section 61-1-13 defines "person" as:
an individual, a corporation, a partnership, a limited liability company, an
association, a joint-stock company, a joint venture, a trust where the interests
of the beneficiaries are evidenced by a security, an unincorporated
organization, a government, or a political subdivision of government.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(19)(2000) (emphasis added). By using the disjunctive "or" in this
definition, the legislature defined an "individual" to be distinct from a "corporation" or
other business entity. It did not, for example, define "person" to include a "corporation and
its president, officers, directors, principals, etc." Moreover, nothing in either Sections 61-11(2) nor 61-1-21 purport to operate differendy when applied to control persons.
In interpreting a statute, courts look first "to its plain language to determine its
meaning." State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App 304,fil, 169 P.3d 778. Under the plain language
of these provisions, Johnson is distinct from both Schwenke and American Dairy, even if
Johnson is a purported "control person" of American Dairy. Tellingly, the State did not
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charge American Dairy. By charging Johnson as an individual, the State needs to show that
Johnson himself "willfully" omitted to state a material fact necessary to make a statement
made by Johnson not misleading, in light of the circumstances under which Johnson made the
statement. Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2), 61-1-21. The key feature of Section 61-1-1 is it
does not require any person to say anything initially. It only criminalizes a statement already
made, a so-called "predicate statement," that is materially misleading because of an omission.
That there is no criminal "control person" liability is further apparent when Sections
61-1-1 and 61-1-21 are read in conjunction with Section 61-1-22. Section 61-1-22 provides
civil remedies for violation of the Act See Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-22(l)(a). Subsection 61l-22(4)(a) provides for civil "control person" liability:
(4) (a) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer liable
under Subsection (1), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller or
buyer, every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions,
every employee of such a seller or buyer who materially aids in the sale or
purchase . . . are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as
the seller or purchaser . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4)(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
Utah Courts "read the plain language of a statute as a whole, with due consideration
of the other provisions and in an effort to interpret them in harmony with each other and
with other statutes under the same and related chapters." State v, Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ^|8,
63 P.3d 667 (quotations and citation omitted). Reading Sections 61-1-1, 61-1-13, 61-1-21,
and 61-1-22 together, it is clear that "control persons" do not have greater criminal liability
than any other individual or entity. Section 61-1-22 shows an intent by the legislature in
certain civil cases to make "control persons" vicariously liable for the acts of others,
including corporations. That there is no corresponding "control person" language in Section
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61-1-21 is a clear indication of legislative intent to limit this secondary "control person"
liability to the civil arena. Johnson cannot be held criminally liable under Section 61-1-21 for
statements made by or acts of Schwenke or American Dairy, or for pure omissions, simply
by virtue of his purported position as president or officer of American Dairy.
B.

The State's argument that Johnson has greater criminal liability through
enhanced disclosure requirements as a control person is contrary to the
plain language of Utah's act.

Contrary to this plain language of Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21, the State insists there
is criminal "control person" liability in the form of heightened disclosure obligations upon
these "control persons." For example, the State identifies hypothetical statements and
disclosures Johnson purportedly should have made to Myers and Young as a so-called
"control person" of American Dairy, such as:
Before Young and Myers signed the documents, neither defendant nor
Schwenke presented any additional "historical business information" about
Americandairy.com or information about the "current or past financial
situation" of the corporation (R. 1999:225; 230). Nor did they provide a
complete list of the principals in the corporation, or any information
concerning the principals' financial background and history (R. 1999:155,225).
In addition, although defendant and Schwenke told Young and Myers there
were "risks in any stock transaction," they never enumerated those risks (R.
1999:145-46, 230). Nor did they offer any additional information concerning
either the $10 million Schwenke supposedly could contribute to the enterprise
or the "possible market for the stock" . .. [or] that, during the period in which
this transaction was presented and then executed . . . [Johnson] had three
federal tax liens against his property for over $1,645,500.00 and had a Small
Business Administration judgment against him.
(Appellee's Br., pp.7-8.)
During trial, Mr. Hines made similar declarations to the jury, over Johnson's
objections, opining that Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 imposed a duty upon Johnson to
disclose certain "important facts . . . in all circumstances," including
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[the] financial statements of the entity which would include audited balance
sheets, that would include the history of any of the control peoplef,] whether
they have been civilly sued, whether they've had administrative actions,
bankruptcies and things likeQ that Competition in the market, conflict of
interest Necessary disclosure would include risk factors and there's . . . It's a
very broad range.
(R. 1999:55-56; see also Johnson's Opening Br., pp. 29-33.) Thus, the State believes, and
improperly informed the jury over Johnson's objections, that control persons, as opposed to
other persons, can violate Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 through pure omissions.
The State's only support for its interpretation is not the language of Sections 61-1-1
or 61-1-21, or even any Utah law, but rather two federal cases interpreting federal law—
Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Merchant Capital, LLC, 483 R3d 747, 750 (11th Cir. 2007) and
Sue^ Equity Investors, LP. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 R3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2001). (Appellee's
Br., pp. 36-38.) The State's reliance on these authorities is completely misplaced.
First and foremost, the cases interpret federal law, not Utah law. In Merchant Capitial,
the SEC alleged that "the defendants violated [Sjection 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
section 17(a) of the Securities A c t " 483 F.3d at 766. These statutes have markedly different
elements than Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21, requiring, among other things, statements made
"with negligence," in the case of Section 17(a)(2)-(3), or with "scienter" for 10(b). Id.
Similarly, Sue% involved a private civil action under Section 10(b), Rule 10(b)(5), and for
control person liability under 15 U.S.C. § 78t. See 250 F.3d at 94. The Utah Supreme Court
has specifically distinguished between Utah and federal securities laws, concluding federal
securities precedent was distinguishable from, and not controlling over, Utah law. State v.
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1358-60 (Utah 1993).
Second, both of federal cases involve civil actions, rather than criminal. The burden
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of proof in Sue^and Merchant Capital was thus not "proof beyond a reasonable doubt/' as it
is here. Sue% furthermore, involved an appeal from a grant of a morion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6). See 250 F.3d at 95. The Second Circuit was merely asked to review the
adequacy of the allegations while "accepting all allegations in the complaint as true"; it did
not, as the State claims, examine the merits of the allegations. Id. at 95-96.
Third, Sue% and Merchant Capital'are factually distinct. Contrary to the defendants in
these cases, it is undisputed that Johnson received no direct or indirect economic benefit,
including shares of American Dairy, from any party at any time. It remains undisputed that
no party intended or believed Johnson would be involved in the company going forward.
(R. 1999:181, 186-87, 313, 329). The State further acknowledges that Young and Myers did
not rely on Johnson's representations and would have done the deal even if Johnson were
not involved. (Appellee's Br., p. 8; see also R. 1999:154,179.) Indeed, given Myers' and
Young's lack of reliance on any statement of Johnson, they could not even maintain a civil
action against Johnson under the federal authorities cited by the State. Under Rule 10b-5,
for example, a plaintiff must show he or she relied on the defendant's omission of material
information and that this omission caused his or her damages. See Sue^} 250 F.3d at 95.
Thus, even if this Court were to accept the State's invitation to carry federal civil law
standards into state criminal law, the charges against Johnson would require dismissal.
Fourth, other federal authorities cited in Johnson's opening brief (pp. 35-36), and
ignored by the State, refused to hold pure omissions actionable, regardless of the speaker. See
e.g., Otis & Co. v. S.E.C, 106 F.2d 579, 582 (6th Cir. 1939) (observing "[Section 17(a)(2)] did
not require appellant to state every fact about stock offered that a prospective purchaser
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might like to know or that might, if known, tend to influence his decision, but it did require
appellant not 'to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading/"); Howing v.
Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470, 1481 (6th Cir. 1987) (observing Rule 10b-5 "prohibits]
silence only where the omitted information is necessary to prevent inaccuracy in existing
disclosure," and thus refusing to hold Rule 10b-5 requires disclosure of all required
information fro registration statements under Rule 13e-3 because "[tjhis is tantamount to
incorporating the disclosure provisions of the securities laws into the antifraud provisions.").
In short, the State's theory of enhanced criminal liability for control persons is not
supported by Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21. These statutes apply equally to "any person,"
including an individual or a corporation, who, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase
of any security willfully omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made by that person, in light of the circumstances under which the statements
are made, not misleading. Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21. A person's status as a
control person cannot alter the language of these statutes. Johnson had no obligation under
the statutes to disclose historical business information or his personal and wholly unrelated
financial information simply because he was a "control person," unless he first uttered a
qualifying predicate statement. The State has identified no such predicate statement.
The State's alternative contention that the phrase in Section 61-1-1(2), "in light of the
circumstances under which they are made," provides for enhanced disclosures from "control
persons" is an unjustified stretch. The pronoun "they" in this phrase refers to the
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"statements," i.e., the predicate statements, not to the person making the statements. The
phrase itself modifies the term "misleading"—i.e., whether a particular predicate statement is
misleading given the circumstances under which it is made. This phrase does not alter the
basic operation of the statute by requiring the person at issue to affirmatively make certain
predicate statements simply because of that person's status with the company. Under the
statute, the "circumstances" already exist when the statement is made, the circumstances do
not create an obligation to make a statement in the first place.
II.

T H E STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT SECTIONS 61-1-1 A N D 61-1-21
OPERATE AS PURE OMISSION STATUTES FOR CONTROL PERSONS
VIOLATES T H E UTAH CONSTITUTION.
In addition to being contrary to the language of the Sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21,

the State's interpretation of the Act violates the Utah Constitution. As indicated in
Johnson's opening brief, (pp. 42-45), the State violated Johnson's due process rights by
contending Johnson could be convicted for failing to affirmatively disclose a sweeping and
undefined list of all facts. This interpretation removed required elements from the statutes
resulting in an unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary application. The State also violated the
Separation of Powers clause of the Utah Constitution by altering the language and operation
of the statute during trial, through Mr. Hines testimony and the prosecutor's statements.
The State argues, however, that Johnson's constitutional rights were not violated
because (1) it did not misrepresent the law and (2) even if it did, Johnson was not prejudiced
because the trial court cured the misrepresentations through end-of-trial jury instructions.
Both of these contentions are without merit. The sole case the State cites in support of its
argument, State v, Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) does not even address either
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of Johnson's constitutional arguments. The issues in luongshaw were prosecutorial
misconduct and insufficiency of evidence. Id. at 927. It should be disregarded out of hand.
1.

The State violated Johnson's due process rights.

Section 61-1-1(2) avoids being overly vague on its face and otherwise satisfies due
process by requiring the defendant to first make a predicate statement, and then provide all
facts necessary to make that predicate statement not misleading in light of the circumstances
under which it is made. Section 61-1-21 also guards against vagueness by requiring a
"willfulj]" violation of Section 61-1-1. As written, these statutes give the defendant the
requisite notice of the prohibited conduct so he can govern himself accordingly.
The State did not apply these statutes to Johnson as written, however. Instead, both
the prosecutor and Mr. Hines told the jury that Section 61-1-1—a confusingly worded
statute at best—required Johnson to disclose an undefined and limitless amount of
information; basically, any additional information about the transaction or Johnson's
unrelated personal history the jury might like to know. {See, e.g., R. 1999:55—"The
important facts that would have to be disclosed in all circumstances are numerous."
(emphasis added).) Indeed, the very manner in which Mr. Hines described the purported list
of required information to the jury—"It's a very broad range"—is vague. (R. 1999:56.)
At that point, the State had not just made an innocuous misstatement of the law, it
had arbitrarily prosecuted Johnson for failing to make disclosures he had no notice or actual
obligation to make. This violated Johnson's due process rights in two ways. First, it
eliminated the State's burden to prove each element of Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 beyond a
reasonable doubt. Namely, the State avoided the statutory obligation to prove the existence
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of a predicate statement that was made misleading by Johnson's willful omission of material
facts. See State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24,^13, 980 P.2d 191 (holding "due process requires that
the prosecution prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt").
Second, the State prosecuted Johnson under an unconstitutionally vague application
of the statutes. Because it is not required by the statute, Johnson could have no notice of a
purported obligation to disclose an undefined "broad range" of information, making his
conviction for failing to do so unconstitutional. See West Valley City v. Streeter, 849 P.2d 613,
615 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void
for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.") This is particularly true here
because the jury was instructed that Myers5 and Young's lack of reliance on Johnson was
irrelevant, so long as the members of jury might have relied on the information if they stood
in Myers' and Young's shoes. (R. 1448.) How does one determine when one has disclosed
everything a hypothetical person, in hindsight, might want to know? Such a standard gives
the State unfettered and arbitrary discretion to designate anything unsaid as a violation. This
is unconstitutional. See Streeter, 849 P.2d at 615 ("A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application . . . .").
The State's assertion that only "control persons" have a heightened affirmative
disclosure obligation does not circumvent this constitutional violation. That argument
suffers from the same basic malady. Namely, it is not provided for by the statutes at issue.
The State's constitutional violations occurred the moment Mr. Hines' incorrect
testimony was given. If such violations could be cured through a jury instruction, and the
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State has cited no law suggesting they can, the curative instruction must at least come at the
time the violations occur. Rather than make timely curative instructions, however, the trial
court overruled Johnson's objections and invited Johnson to cross-examine Mr. Hines about
his opinions on the law. (See, e.g., R. 1999:55-57.) The "curative instructions" the State
primarily relies on were instructions given by the trial court at the very beginning and the
very end of trial. (See Appellee's Br., p. 42.) See, e.g., U.S. ex. rel Burke v. Greer, 756 F.2d
1295, 1303 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Such final jury instructions are 'ordinarily not sufficient,'
however, to cure constitutional errors." (citation omitted)).
Although the State does reference one instruction occurring during Mr. Hines'
testimony, a single instruction should not be sufficient to ameliorate an entire day of
constitutionally impermissible testimony and statements. (SeeR. 1999:17-18, 51-52, 55-57,
59-61, 62,101,104-05,109, 485-86, 527-28, 529-32.) Moreover, the referenced instruction
itself is deficient. The trial court did not attempt to inform the jury what the actual law is or
otherwise correct Mr. Hines' misstatements. Rather, the instruction came in this context:
Mr. Johnson: Objection and ask that be stricken. I think that also goes to the
jury instruction we, we discussed.
The Judge: Well the court is going, the court is going to indicate to the jury
that at some point in this trial the court is going to give you instructions with
respect to a, issues of law that you, that will govern your deliberations. And a,
at that time a, the court will instruct you as to what the law is.
Go ahead Mr. Baer [Prosecutor].
Q [Prosecutor]. Are there any other important significant factors that a, come
into your purview, that come into your consideration when you're taking a
look at a. circumstances of an individual or entities that are making
these sort of transactions, exchanges?
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A. [Mr. Hines]. I don't think its possible to specifically list all the
circumstances that would need to be disclosed. Again, the test is does a
reasonable prudent investor, is that a fact that they would want to know.
That's as narrow as I can make it.
(R. 1999:61-62 (emphasis added).)
Thus, the trial court informed the jury that at some point it would be telling it the
law, but did not correct any misstatement of the law. Indeed, direcdy after the trial court's
admonition, Mr. Hines again misinformed the jury that the law, according the Department
of Enforcement, required Johnson to disclose all facts a reasonable investor "would want to
know." (Id,) There was no correction of this error. If the trial court's limited instructions
were sufficient to cure all of Mr. Hines' constitutionally impermissible testimony, then it was
error to allow Mr. Hines' legal-conclusion-laden testimony in the first place. It would not be
helpful to the jury, making it an improper use of expert testimony. See U.R.E. 702 (requiring
expert testimony be "helpful"); accord State v. Davis, 155 P.3d 909, 914 (Utah Ct App. 1997).
2.

Violation of the Separation of Powers clause.

The State further transgressed the constitutional requirement of Separation of Powers
by presenting a member of the executive branch, the Director for Enforcement for the Utah
Division of Securities, as its expert witness and having him, in effect, legislate from the
witness stand by offering an incorrect interpretation of the law. The State does not address
this argument with any meaningful analysis, relying exclusively, and incorrectiy, on hongshaw
to claim that Johnson was not prejudiced and therefore there was no constitutional violation.
The State's argument is not logical. Although Johnson was prejudiced, this is an
entirely different question than whether the State violated the constitution in the first place.
Mr. Hines, and the State through Mr. Hines, assumed the role of the legislature when he
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testified as to the requirements of Utah's securities laws, and altered the language of the
statutes to lessen the State's burden by transforming Section 61-1-1(2) into a pure omission
statute for control persons. This is not the same as a police offer testifying as an expert
regarding drug terminology, or even Mr. Hines testifying as to the mechanics of an IPO.
Rather, when Mr. Hines testifies that the law says something it does not, Mr. Hines and the
State stray into the role of the legislature, which is proscribed by the Utah Constitution. See
Utah Const, art. V, sec. 1; art. VI, sec. 1. The State may wish the statute was different, but
the State is not the legislature and not permitted to make law or punish individuals for
"constructive offenses." McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987).
The trial court failed to correct this constitutional violation with any timely curative
instruction, as indicated above, prejudicing Johnson as the jury likely relied on impermissible
grounds, i.e., Johnson's failure to disclose all material facts, in convicting Johnson.
III.

T H E TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING MR.
HINES' INCORRECT LEGAL-CONCLUSION-LADEN TESTIMONY,
Even assuming Mr. Hines' improper testimony does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, the trial court still abused its discretion by allowing Mr. Hines'
incorrect legal-conclusion-based testimony for the reasons discussed in Johnson's opening
brief. The State argues that Mr. Hines' testimony was proper because (1) expert testimony
couched in legal conclusions is permissible in securities cases because of the technical nature
of securities; (2) Mr. Hines testimony provided correct interpretations of the law; and (3)
defendant was not prejudiced by the testimony, in any event.
The State's first contention mischaracterizes the issue. Johnson acknowledges that
expert testimony may be permissible in securities cases because of the technical nature of
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securities. Here, however, the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Mr. Hines to go
beyond describing the technical operations of securities, and to instead opine at length on
the Utah Division of Securities' interpretation of Utah's securities laws. Rather than control
the proceedings or diligendy remind the jury that it was the court's role to provide the law,
the trial court overruled Johnson's objections by telling Johnson he could cross-examine Mr.
Hines. [See, e.g., R. 1999:51-52.) Because he had no other choice, Johnson accepted this
obligation and presented his own expert witness, Nathan Drage, who was also questioned at
length about the effect and language of Utah's securities laws. (R. 1999:62-105, 439-65.) As
a result, Johnson's trial improperly devolved into an argument over the requirements of
Utah's securities laws. Presented with such divergent interpretations of what the law
requires, the jury could not help but be confused by what they heard, particularly given the
trial court's lack of guidance. This is not helpful to the trier of fact and should not have
been allowed. See U.R.E. 702 (requiring expert testimony be helpful).
Although the State argues that Mr. Hines did, on occasion, provide the correct
statement of the law to the jury, this argument only belabors the point. The trial court
should not have allowed Mr. Hines to vacillate between correct and incorrect interpretations
of the law; it is confusing. It puts the jury in the untenable position of determing which is
the correct interpretation. And, as indicated above, if Mr. Hines' improper and incorrect
legal testimony could be corrected with final jury instructions with the correct law, then there
was little point to allowing his testimony in the first place, making it improper as not helpful.
Next, as discussed above, there is also no merit to the State's second argument that
Mr. Hines' testimony regarding disclosures required of "control persons" was a correct
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interpretation of the law.
Finally, as indicated in Johnson's opening brief, he was severely prejudiced by the
erroneous and insufficiendy cured interpretations of Sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21. Once
Johnson's conduct is considered in light of the correct interpretation of these statutes, it is
clear he did not violate the law. One of the few possible predicate statements identified by
the State is that Schwenke introduced Johnson as a "high-powered lawyer" and a "securities
expert." (Appellees' Br., p. 6.) Even assuming Johnson is accountable for Schwenke's
statements, which he is not, there is nothing misleading about a description of Johnson as a
"securities expert." Johnson has Wall Street experience. More importandy, the State never
indicated what additional material facts would make this statement not misleading.
Regarding Johnson's status as a high powered lawyer, the State asserts this was
misleading because Johnson
never told Myers and Young that, during the period in which this transaction
was presented and then executed, he "was subject to disciplinary proceedings
before the Utah State Bar alleging misappropriation of client funds from an
event which occurred in October of 1992, [but which had not been finalized
as of August 9, 2000 and that Defendant Johnson was in August of 2000 a
lawyer in good standing licensed to practice law in the State of Utah."]
(Appellee's Br., p. 8, quotingK. 1425.) Notably, the State's brief truncates the stipulated
disclosure so as to remove the bracketed portion. When the full stipulation is considered,
the statement Johnson is "a high-powered lawyer" is not misleading. Johnson was a lawyer
at all relevant times. Further, neither Young, Myers nor Schwenke regarded Johnson as their
attorney nor American Dairy's attorney. (R.1999:182-83,186-87, 220-221, 303.)
The State also credits Johnson with vaguely describing to Young how stocks work,
describing to Myers how the general process of taking a company public works and musing,
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with Schwenke, about possible prices for the American Dairy stock if there were to be an
initial public offer ("IPO") at some point in the future. (See Appellee's Br., pp. 5-6.) The
State does not even assert that Johnson's explanation was tied to American Dairy or to any
purported offer or sale of American Dairy's stock.1
Indeed, all other circumstances and statements indicate it was not. Myers asked
Johnson whether "he could be involved in that public offering," if and when it took place.
(Id.) Johnson said "it would be highly unusual but it could happen." (Id.) Myers and Young
then had their own attorney review and amend the Agreement to add language to undo the
transaction if American Dairy did not go public within two years. (Id.; see also Agreement, p.
7,1[6(c).) Although Myers asserted that both Schwenke and Johnson identified possible
IPO prices for American Dairy stock, (R. 1999:218), the alleged "offer or sale" at issue was
clearly not an IPO and no party involved in that transaction believed otherwise. In fact,
Young testified that Johnson made no representations about being involved in any future
IPO. (R. 1999:166.) Even assuming Johnson (rather than Schwenke) made these
statements, it is difficult to determine which omissions rendered them materially misleading,
let alone how they are even relevant to the August 9, 2000 "offer or sale" at issue.
Accordingly, because there are no identified misleading statements that could support
Johnson's conviction, the jury must have relied upon, or was at least irreparably confused by,
the State's and Mr. Hines' misstatements of law in convicting Johnson. Johnson was thus
gready prejudiced by the errors, requiring reversal.

1

Cf Warner Comm. v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482,1491 (D.C. Del. 1984) ("It is well
established that the federal securities laws do not impose a duty to disclose information
regarding current or future plans that are uncertain and contingent in nature.").
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IV.

T H E SECURITIES FRAUD STATUTE IS N O T APPLICABLE TO
J O H N S O N BECAUSE THERE WAS N O "OFFER" OR "SALE" OF A
SECURITY BY J O H N S O N FOR VALUE.
As indicated in Johnson's opening brief, Section 61-1-1 is not applicable to Johnson

in this case because there was no "offer" or "sale" of a security by Johnson "for value." See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 (requiring an "offer" or "sale" to trigger the statute); 61-1-13(22)
(2000) (defining an sale or offer to be a "disposition" or "attempt... to dispose" of a
security "for value"). It is undisputed that Johnson received no direct financial benefit from
the transaction at issue. He received no money or property from Myers, Young, Schwenke,
or any other person or entity involved in this transaction. It is further indisputable that
Johnson received no indirect financial benefit from this deal. He neither owned nor received
any shares in American Dairy. The August 9, 2000 transaction served, at best, to transfer
Myer's and Young's ownership of Milk-King, LLC's (the "LLC") property from the LLC to
American Dairy, of which Myers and Young were the only shareholders. That they would
remain the only shareholders was, in fact, guaranteed by Paragraph 3(b)(1) of the Agreement.
Evidence adduced at the restitution hearing further establishes that Myers and Young
actually held title to the "transferred" equipment personally and disposed of the property
without regard to a purported ownership interest by American Dairy. (See R. 1999: 172,
184,2075:115-29, 200-02 ; R. 2075(2d): 6-7,14-19, 30-39, 47-49; Restitution Exhibits 3-6, 910,12,18-19; See also Johnson's Opening Brief, Fact Nos. 33, 42, and pp. 47-51.) Moreover,
this evidence proves the property allegedly transferred by Myers and Young did not have the
values testified to at trial, but was so encumbered as to be valueless. (Id.) This independently
establishes that Myers' and Young's purported disposition of property was not "for value,"
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to trigger Section 61-1-1 liability, and certainly did not amount to a transfer of $10,000 or
more "worth" of property to trigger second degree felony liability under Section 61-1-21 (2).2
Notwithstanding these undisputed facts, the State makes four arguments as to why
Johnson made an offer or sale of American Dairy stock to Myers and Young under 61-1-1.
First, the State argues "nothing in defendant's or Schwenke's description of their proposal
suggested the victims' transfer of their farm from their LLC to Americandairy.com would
merely effect a change in the form of their ownership of the farm." (Appellee's Br., p. 13.)
This argument misses the mark. The State does not identify a single "proposal" made
by Johnson; all of the statements identified by the State in support of this argument were
made by Schwenke. (Id.) Johnson was not charged with conspiracy to violate Section 61-1-1,
and cannot be held criminally liable for Schwenke's or American Dairy's acts. By charging
Johnson as an individual, the State must show Johnson made the alleged offer or sale.
More importandy, Schwenke's preliminary description of his plan is not an "offer" or
"sale" to "dispose o f securities of American Dairy under the statute. Utah Code Ann. §61l-13(22)(b). The State ignores the actual facts of August 9, 2000 transaction at issue. Just
because Myers and Young were not specifically told "this transaction will merely effect a
change in the form of [your] ownership" of LLC property, does not change the fact that this
is exacdy what the transaction did. The economic reality of the deal, not the use of magic
words, is determinative. Indeed, Myers and Young were promised in the Agreement that it
would merely change their form of ownership, insomuch as they were guaranteed to be the
2

This was the basis, in part, for Johnson's Motion for a New Trial and Renewed
Motion for a New Trial, which the trial court erred in denying. These grounds are discussed
in detail in Johnson's Opening Brief, pp. 46-51. That Johnson properly perfected his appeal
of this issue is established in Section V, below.
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only shareholders of American Dairy. (Agreement, 1|3(b)(i).) While the State argues Johnson
should not be given credit because Myers and Young were just the first shareholders, the
fact remains that Myers and Young were always the only shareholders. This is guaranteed by
the Agreement. For any other persons to become shareholders, the Agreement would have
to be amended, with Myers' and Young's permission, and a new transaction completed.
Johnson cannot be held criminally liable for a hypothetical transaction that never occurred.
The State's second argument, that the Agreement itself constitutes an offer or sale of
a security, is meritless for similar reasons. The recitations in the Agreement regarding a
"purchase and sale7' of American Dairy's stock do not change the fact that Myers and Young
were the only ones on both sides of the transaction. Myers and Young were the buyers and
the sellers, not Johnson, who received absolutely no economic benefit from the transaction.
Third, the State disputes Johnson's citation to Premier Van Schaack Realty, Inc. v. Sieg,
2002 UT App 173, 51 P.3d 24, and argues that Capital General Corp. v. Utah Department of
Business Regulation, 111 P.2d 494, 497 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) supports its case rather than
Johnson's. The State's attempt to force the present case into the facts of Capital Generally
misplaced. In Capital General the Utah Securities Division filed an administration action
against Capital General Corporation (the "Corporation") alleging unlawful distribution of
shares without registration. Id. at 495. The Corporation had purchased 1,000,000 shares of
another company ("Company") for $2,000, making it the sole shareholder of the Company.
Id. The Corporation then distributed these shares to 900 of its clients for free. Id. This
Court held that this distribution was "for value" to trigger liability under Section 61-1-7 of
the Utah Securities Act because it created a market for the shares that did not exist before,
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some of which shares were still owned by the Corporation. Id. at 497-98.
Unlike the defendant in Capital General, Johnson owned no shares of American Dairy
and thus received no direct or indirect financial benefit from the transaction at issue.
Contrary to the State's insistence, Johnson is not the same "person" as American Dairy
under the Act, as described above, even if he is a so-called "control person." Notably, no
"control persons" of the Corporation are implicated in Capital General. Under the Capital
General fact pattern, it is Myers and Young, the sole shareholders, who stand in the shoes of
the Corporation. If Myers and Young were to give away some of their shares of American
Dairy, they might benefit from the creation of a market. Johnson, however, would not,
particularly because no party believed he was going to be involved in American Dairy going
forward. (R. 1999:182-83, 186-87, 317, 352; R 2075(2d): 7, 27.)
This Court's decision in Sieg, on the other hand, supports Johnson's position,
although it is not a securities case. In Sieg, this Court held that there was no consideration,
and thus no sale or exchange, because the seller retained an interest in property he
transferred to a joint venture in exchange for an interest in the joint venture. Id, at ^12-16.
The purported sale involved a mere "change in the form of ownership" of the property. Id.
at 1HJ12 (quotations and citation omitted). Similarly, Myers and Young retained the same
interest in the property both before and after the transaction at issue. The only difference is
they held it through American Dairy rather than through the LLC.
Finally, the State argues that the transaction at issue was an automatic offer or sale
under Section 61-l-13(22)(c)(vii) (2000), which provides:
The issuance of a security under a merger, consolidation, reorganization,
recapitalization, reclassification, or acquisition of assets shall constitute the
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offer or sale of the security issued as well as the offer to buy or the purchase
of any security surrendered in connection therewith . . . .
Id. (emphasis added). The State does not indicate how this provision is applicable. In fact, it
is not. The transaction at issue was not a merger or consolidation because the LLC was not
merged into, consolidated with, or otherwise absorbed by American Dairy. 19 Am. Jur. 2d
Corporations § 2168 (2008) ("A merger is often defined as the absorption of one
corporation by another . . . ."). The LLC's existence continued after the August 9, 2000
transaction. There are also no facts to suggest the August 9, 2000 transaction involved the
"issuance of a security under a . .. reorganization, recapitalization, [or] reclassification of"
American Dairy or the LLC. Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(22)(c)(vii). Moreover, Myers and
Young did not surrender their LLC membership interests to Johnson or anybody else. In
fact, because there were less than five members of the LLC, the LLC's interests are not even
considered securities under the Act. See id. § 61-1-13(24)(b)(ii).
Although it is difficult to tell from the State's analysis, it presumably relies on the
"acquisition of assets" language of this provision. This too is inapplicable. Because Johnson
is not the same "person" as American Dairy under the Act, and because Johnson owns no
shares of American Dairy, he did not direcdy or indirectiy acquire any assets in the August 9,
2000 transaction. Myers and Young, the sole shareholders of American Dairy following the
alleged asset acquisition, merely altered their form of ownership of these assets from LLC to
American Dairy. This conclusion is further buttressed by the facts that (a) Myers and Young
continued to control all aspects of the dairy operations and receive all proceeds therefrom in
the same manner as they did prior to converting from the LLC to American Dairy; (b) title
to the farm equipment supposedly acquired by American Dairy was never actually owned by
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the LLC and was never actually transferred to American Dairy, but was held personally by
Myers and Young, who later disposed of that property without regard to American Dairy;
and (c) the Agreement allowed Myers and Young to undo the transaction if in two years
American Dairy did not go public. (Johnson's Opening Br., Fact Nos. 33, 42, and pp. 47-51;
Agreement ^|6(c).) Thus, there was no actual acquisition of these assets by American Dairy
or disposition of these assets by Myers and Young in the August 9, 2000 transaction.
Moreover, in asserting this provision applies, the State once again ignores the
language of the statute, which requires the "issuance of a security under a[n] . . . .
acquisition of assets." There were no securities "issued" to effect an asset acquisition.
American Dairy shares were already issued as of August 9, 2000. (Agreement, recitals, p. 1.)
In sum, there was no offer or sale of a security by Johnson to trigger securities
liability because Johnson derived no value from the August 9, 2000 transaction. Myers and
Young, at best, merely altered their form of ownership of some of the LLC's assets, without
affecting their actual ownership interests in these assets.
V.

JOHNSON PERFECTED HIS APPEAL FROM T H E ORDERS DENYING
HIM A NEW TRIAL AND FROM T H E RESTITUTION ORDER BY
TIMELY FILING AN AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL.
The State does not meaningfully address the merits of Johnson's appeal from the trial

court's Orders on Johnson's Motion for a New Trial, Renewed Motion for a New Trial, and
Restitution. Rather, the State seeks to preclude this Court's review of these Orders on a
technicality, arguing Johnson did not "perfect" his right to appeal these Orders. The State's
argument is meritless. Johnson perfected his rights to appeal all of the trial court's Orders in
this case through his timely Notice of Appeal, filed November 8, 2007, and his Amended
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Notice of Appeal, filed August 19, 2008, within 30 days of the trial court's entry of the final
Order in this case. (Amended Notice of Appeal, attached as Addendum A to this Reply.)
Johnson's Notice of Appeal was filed on November 8, 2007, within 30 days after the
Order Denying Johnson's Motion for a New Trial was entered on October 10, 2007. The
State's argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider errors in that Order is patently
groundless. Because Johnson's Motion for a New Trial was a post judgment motion under
Rule 4(b), it tolled the time for appeal from all issues preceding this. See Utah R. App. P.
4(b). The State has thus waived its right to address these issues. This Court should reverse
on the grounds stated in Johnson's opening Brief, pp. 46-51.
The State's perfection argument regarding the Restitution Order and Order Denying
Johnson's Renewed Motion are similarly groundless. The State fails to acknowledge that
Johnson timely filed an Amended Notice of Appeal wherein he specifically indicated an
intent to appeal from these Orders. Johnson, through counsel, filed the Amended Notice in
the Court of Appeals, as reflected on the Amended Notice and the Appellate Docket, and as
instructed by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, Lisa Collins.3 (See August 19, 2008 Letter to
Lisa Collins, attached as Addendum B to this Reply.) Johnson served a copy of the
Amended Notice upon the Utah Attorney General's Office, giving it notice of his intent to
appeal these issues, and satisfying the purpose of a notice of appeal. See Nunley v. Stan Kat%
Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798, 800 (1964) (observing "the object of a notice

3

This was an unusual situation because the record was already in the Court of Appeals
and a briefing schedule had been issued when Johnson's counsel discovered the State had
failed to prepare a final Order on Johnson's Renewed Motion as instructed by the trial court
Johnson thus filed the Amended Notice in the Court of Appeals as instructed. Johnson
further notes that Rule 4 does not require amended notices be filed in the trial court.
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of appeal is to advise the opposite party that an appeal has been taken .. . .").
Moreover, even if the Amended Notice were somehow insufficient, this does not
affect Johnson's right to appeal the errors in the Restitution Order. The State curiously
argues, based on an incorrect interpretation of State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, 106 P,3d 729, that
"where a final judgment of conviction in a criminal case is entered before final determination
of restitution, a timely notice of appeal from the underlying judgment does not necessarily
constitute a timely notice of appeal from the order determining restitution." (Appellee's Br.,
p. 50.) In actuality, Garnerflatlyrejects the State's argument, holding:
where orders for restitution remain open to be decided at a later date, the
subsequent entry of the amount of restitution is not a new and final judgment
for purposes of appealing the underlying merits of a criminal conviction.
Entering a restitution amount is more like a clarification of a judgment than a
material modification because the inclusion does not "chang[e] the substance
or character of the judgment."
Id. at ^{17 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Because Johnson's Notice of Appeal of
the underlying conviction was timely, he preserved his right to appeal the Restitution Order.
Johnson thus properly perfected his right to appeal all of the issues raised herein
through his timely Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal. The Notice and
Amended Notice bookend all issues in this case, satisfying Rule 4. Accordingly, the State's
technicality based arguments are groundless. This Court should reverse the aforementioned
Orders on the grounds stated in Johnson's original brief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in Johnson's opening brief, Johnson's
conviction must be vacated or at least reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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Defendant Jamis M. Johnson, by and through his counsel, hereby provides this Amended
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the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Fourth District Court, including the following;
1.

Sentence, Judgment and Commitment entered July 2,2007, and all preceding

rulings and orders of the trial court.

2008.

2.

Ruling and Order on Defendant's Motion for New Trial entered October JO, 2007,

3.

Restitution Order entered December 5,2007.

4.

Order Denying Defendant's Renewed Motion for New Trial entered August 12,

Defendant's original Notice of Appeal was filed November 8, 2007. Although the
original Notice predates the Restitution Order and the Order on Defendant's Renewed Motion for
a New Trial, Defendant indicated his intent to appeal issues arising from these Orders in his
Docketing Statement, filed December 13,2007.
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August 19, 2008

By Hand Delivery
Lisa Collins
Utah Court of Appeal
450 South State
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230
Re:

Case Name: State v. Johnson
Court of Appeals Case Number: 20070909

Dear Lisa:
Enclosed please find Defendant Jamis Johnson's Amended Notice of Appeal. Thank you
again for all of your help on this case. It is much appreciated.

Sincerely,

Lebenta
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